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The last fifty years have witnessed large secular increases in educational attain-
ment and R&D intensity. The fact that these trends have not stimulated more 
rapid income growth has been a persistent puzzle for growth theorists. We con-
struct a model of endogenous economic growth in which income growth, R&D in-
tensity, and educational attainment depend on the complexity of new technologies. 
An increase in complexity that makes passive learning more difficult, induces in-
creases in R&D and education, alongside a decline in income growth. Our expla-
nation also predicts a concurrent rise in the skill premium. 
 
KEYWORDS: Endogenous growth, learning, R&D, educational attainment, wage 
inequality, technological complexity. 
JEL Classifications: O40, E10. 
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pinteam@fiu.edu and peter.thompson2@fiu.edu). An earlier version of this paper circu-
lated with the title “Economic Growth in a World of Ideas: Some Pleasant Arithmetic.” 
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Figure 1 contains some US aggregate time-series that are now very familiar. 
Panel (a) shows a dramatic rise since 1950 in the intensity of R&D, whether 
measured as a proportion of the labor force or as a proportion of aggregate ex-
penditure. Panel (b) shows a similar marked increase in educational attainment. 
One may quibble about the significance of these data. R&D has no doubt become 
more formal and, consequently, more broadly defined in the official statistics, and 
much of the increase in educational attainment may be a consumption good that 
contributes little to measured productivity growth (Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare, 
1997; Dinopoulos and Thompson, 1999). Nonetheless, given the strength of the 
observed trends, the underlying real changes in R&D and educational attainment 
must be considerable. However, panels (c) and (d) show that, despite these dra-
matic changes in the key inputs of the knowledge production function, there has 
been no corresponding rise in either per capita income growth or labor productiv-
ity growth. To the contrary, long-run income growth has declined somewhat over 
this period. 
Despite the familiarity of these data, growth theorists have made little progress 
explaining them. Because R&D intensity and years of schooling cannot rise for-
ever, we must be observing transitional dynamics. Yet most growth models pre-
dict that per capita income growth will rise along a transition path characterized 
by rising inputs into the knowledge-creation process. In one notable exception, 
Jones (2002) has shown that the data are consistent with out-of-steady state pre-
dictions of a semi-endogenous growth model in which new ideas are shared across 
countries. In his model, per capita income growth is proportional to population 
growth in the steady state, but can be sustained at a constant, higher, rate when 
input intensity is rising. We learn much from Jones’ analysis about the properties 
of a particular class of endogenous growth models but, because the secular in-
creases in R&D and education are treated as exogenous data, our understanding 
of the evidence in Figure 1 remains incomplete. 
We propose a simple explanation for Figure 1, in which rising R&D and educa-
tional attainment are endogenous responses to a change in the economic envi-
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environment, and in which the growth rate of income declines despite the rise in 
knowledge-creating inputs. We construct a quality ladders model that incorpo-
rates learning in the spirit of much earlier work by Young (1991, 1993), Lucas 
(1993), and Parente (1994). New product generations raise the quality of a prod-
uct line, but firms can further raise the quality of any given generation at a rate 
that depends on their employment of skilled labor and the complexity of the 
technology they are using. Our explanation for the data is that a secular increase 
in complexity in the latter half of the 20th century has made passive learning 
more difficult. In response, firms increased their demand for skilled labor, part of 
which was to be engaged in applied R&D, and part in white-collar production-
related employment. The increased demand for skill raised the returns to educa-
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FIGURE 1. R&D, education and economic performance in the US. For sources, see 
the appendix. 
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tion, which in turn induced a rise in education attainment. Consequently, our 
explanation also is consistent with a rise in the returns to schooling and in the 
skill premium.  
Kaboski (2001) developed an assignment model in which heterogeneous workers 
are assigned to a continuum of tasks that increase in complexity over time at a 
constant rate. More educated workers have a comparative advantage in complex 
tasks, and all workers seek more education as task complexity rises. Calibrating 
this model to the entire 20th century experience, Kaboski is able to mimic some 
demanding empirical patterns, most notably the fall and then rise of both wage 
inequality and the returns to schooling over the century, at the same time that 
educational attainment is rising everywhere in the distribution. To accomplish 
this, however, Kaboski had to construct a complex model in which not only rising 
task complexity, but also falling fertility and rising life expectancy drive the data. 
We have fewer ambitions for our model, but we are able to explain Figure 1 with 
a simple, transparent framework. 
One implication of our model is that it may generate a very different future from 
that implied by Jones’ (2002), analysis, which contains some unpleasant arithme-
tic. Applying traditional growth accounting techniques, Jones concludes that ris-
ing input intensity accounts for 80 percent of post-war growth. Eventually, the 
secular increases in R&D intensity and educational attainment must end. When 
they do, income growth can be expected to decline dramatically, perhaps to no 
more than one-fifth of its post-war trend. What happens out of sample in our 
model depends of course upon the future behavior of complexity. Our model ex-
plains the data as a response to a one-time increase in complexity that slowly 
diffuses through the economy as firms gradually adopt new product generations 
that embody the new basic technology. If this is more or less what has been hap-
pening, then our model generates some pleasant arithmetic: inevitable future de-
clines in the growth of R&D intensity and educational attainment need not pres-
age a decline in the growth rate of income. 
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Our theory rests on some precise assumptions, and it is worth fixing ideas on 
these directly: technology has become more complex over time; learning by doing 
is more difficult in complex environments; and skill is more valuable in complex 
learning environments. None of these assumptions seems particularly contentious, 
but it turns out to be quite difficult to produce direct evidence for them. We do 
not have any easy way to measure complexity, and attempts to measure rates of 
passive learning have proved to be rather unreliable (Mishina, 1999; Lazonick 
and Brush, 1985; Sinclair, Klepper, and Cohen, 2000; Thompson, 2001). Nonethe-
less, there is a body of indirect evidence consistent with our assumptions, which 
is briefly reviewed here. 
A. Learning and complexity 
Jovanovic and Nyarko’s (1995) Bayesian model of learning is perhaps the best-
known study of the interaction between complexity and learning. They define 
complexity in terms of the number of independent tasks that must be undertaken 
in the production process. Their model predicts that in more complex technolo-
gies there will be more to learn, but the rate of learning is slower. Parameter es-
timates obtained from fitting their model to a dozen data sets are consistent with 
these predictions. In a series of papers (Argote, Beckman and Epple, 1990; Darr, 
Argote and Epple, 1995; Epple, Argote and Devadas, 1991), Argote, Epple and 
colleagues obtained similar results from estimating learning curves from three dis-
tinct activities – the operation of pizza franchises, an automotive assembly plant, 
and wartime shipbuilding. Figure 2 plots the learning curves implied by their pa-
rameter estimates. 1 If we are willing to entertain the notion that shipbuilding is a 
                                         
1 Epple and Argote assume that knowledge rises log-linearly with cumulative output and 
declines as a function of time. They interpret their results as evidence of organizational 
forgetting. Thompson (2004) has argued that forgetting may be a spurious result of as-
suming a learning curve in which, absent forgetting, productivity must rise without 
bound. In Figure 2 we simply plot the predicted productivity levels implied by the regres-
sion estimates. 
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more complex task than automotive assembly, and automotive assembly is more 
complex than operating a pizza franchise, the learning curves yield half-lives of 
learning consistent with the predictions of Jovanovic and Nyarko.  
Our ranking of Argote and Epple’s three technologies is inevitably subjective. 
Unfortunately, Jovanovic and Nyarko’s inferences about the relative complexity 
of different activities are even more problematic for our purposes, as they are ob-
tained from the learning curves themselves. Galbraith (1990) took perhaps a 
more objective approach by allowing senior project engineers learning to work 
with new technologies to evaluate their complexity. He studied 32 instances in 
which high-technology companies transferred core manufacturing technology to 
plants located at least 100 miles from where the technology was originally in use. 
The senior project engineer at each recipient location was asked to rate on a five-
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FIGURE 2. Learning curves from three industries. Curves plot the 
function  qt/q*, where qt=Ktγ, Kt=λKt−1+1. and q*=(1−λ)γ. Parame-
ter estimates are:  γ=0.71, λ=0.93 for shipbuilding (from Argote, 
Beckman and Epple, 1990, table 1, column 1); γ=0.28, λ=0.92 for 
automotive assembly (from Epple, Argote and Devadas, 1991, table 1, 
column 4); γ=0.104, λ=0.80 for pizza franchises (from Darr, Argote 
and Epple, 1995, table 1, column 4). 
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point scale the complexity of the transferred technology relative to the recipient’s 
existing technologies. Galbraith shows that the time it took the recipient site to 
reach the level of productivity at the donor site increased significantly with the 
complexity of the technology, even controlling for an initial loss in productivity 
that was higher in the more complex transfers. An increase of one on the five-
point scale led to an increase in the initial productivity loss of about 16.7% and 
an increase in the recovery time of the lost productivity of about 15 percent.  
B. Skill and Learning 
An extensive literature on wage inequality and technology is consistent with our 
assumption that skilled labor has an advantage in learning more complex tech-
nologies and that, as technology became more complex in recent decades, the re-
turns to education and unobservable skills have increased. As Figure 3 shows, 
there has been a marked increase in the college wage premium despite the con-
current rise in the relative supply of college graduates. 
This sharp rise in the return to schooling (see also Blackburn, Bloom and Free-
man, 1990; Katz and Murphy, 1992), in the premium for unobserved ability 
(Juhn, Murphy and Pierce, 1993; DiNardo and Pischke, 1997), and in the pre-
mium for observable indicators of cognitive ability (Murnane, Willet and Levy, 
1995) are all consistent with our assertion that education and ability have be-
come more valuable as complexity has increased. Evidence that earnings profiles 
are steeper for educated workers (Psacahropoulos and Layard, 1979; Knight and 
Sabot, 1981; Altonji and Dunn, 1995; Altonji and Pierret, 1997; Brunello and 
Comi, 2004; Low et al., 2004) is consistent with our assertion that educated 
workers are more able to learn. 
If newer technologies are more complex than older technologies, our assumptions 
imply a positive correlation between wages and use of new technology, and this is 
again consistent with empirical evidence. Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998) docu-
ment an increased demand for skilled labor during the last five decades, and es-
pecially since 1970. They argue that the diffusion of computers and related 
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technologies contributed significantly to this phenomenon and show that skill up-
grading occurred more rapidly in industries that are computer intensive. Berman, 
Bound and Griliches (1994) and Berman, Bound and Machin (1998) find large 
within–industry increases in the share of non-production workers in manufactur-
ing, both in the US and in a sample of OECD countries, despite the rise in their 
relative wages during the 1980s and 1990s. They also show that the increase in 
the share of non-production workers is associated with R&D and computer in-
vestment. Allen (2001), focusing on the timeframe 1979-1989, shows that wage 
gaps by schooling increased the most in industries with rising R&D intensity and 
accelerating growth in the capital-labor ratio.2 
                                         
2 Further evidence relating the wage structure to technology use can be found in Krueger 
(1993), Dunne and Schmitz (1995), Doms, Dunne and Troske (1997), and Thompson 
(2003). 
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FIGURE 3. The college wage premium and the relative supply of col-
lege graduates. Source: Acemoglu (2002). 
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Despite the wealth of wage data consistent with our assertions, we must ac-
knowledge that the evidence is only circumstantial. Rising wage inequality is also 
predicted by models in which skilled individuals have an advantage simply in 
adopting or working with new technologies (Caselli, 1999; Galor and Moav; 2000, 
Lloyd-Ellis, 2002). Chari and Hopenhayn (1993) predict that workers employed 
on newer technologies will exhibit steeper earnings profiles, even though all work-
ers learn at the same rate. R&D intensive industries, and industries and plants 
using newer technologies are likely to be more capital intensive, and capital-skill 
complementarity may be sufficient to explain their higher wages. 
The Model 
Models that combine R&D, new product generations and within-generation learn-
ing have tended to be rather complicated. As a result, they have also tended to 
be rather stylized. We do not depart from that “tradition” here. After laying out 
the model, we present our analysis in four parts. In sections A and B, we assume 
that skilled labor is in fixed supply. Section A characterizes the steady state, 
while Section B describes the dynamic responses of income and the skill premium 
to a one-time increase in complexity that affects each firm after it has adopted 
their its product generation. Sections C and D allow the supply of skill to re-
spond endogenously to changes in demand.  
A representative agent’s intertemporal utility is given by 
 
0
ln ( )tU e D t dtρ
∞
−= ∫ , (1) 
where 
 
/( 1)1
1/ ( 1)/
0
( ) ( , ) ( , )D t q i t x i t di
θ θ
θ θ θ
−
−  =    ∫ , (2) 
is a quality-adjusted Dixit-Stiglitz consumption index defined over a continuum 
of goods of unit mass. The parameter q(i,t) is an index of the quality of good i, 
while x(i,t) denotes its quantity.  
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The familiar Euler equation, 
 ( ) ( )
( )
E t r t
E t
ρ= − , (3) 
where E(t) is the agent’s nominal expenditure on consumption goods, solves the 
consumer’s intertemporal optimization problem. Nominal expenditure is the nu-
meraire, so that r(t)=ρ, and instantaneous consumer demands satisfy 
 1
1
0
( , ) ( , )( , )
( , ) ( , )
q i t p i tx i t
q i t p i t di
θ
θ
−
−
=
∫
. (4) 
Production is carried out by unskilled labor, one unit of which produces one unit 
of output. Let wu(t) be the wage of the unskilled. Each good is produced by a 
monopolistic firm i which chooses a constant markup over marginal cost, setting 
a price p(i,t)=wu(t)θ/(θ−1), and consequently facing demand 
 
( 1) ( , )
( , )
( )u
i t
x i t
w t
θ α
θ
−= , (5) 
where 
1
0
( , ) ( , )/ ( , ) ( , )/ ( , )i t q i t q i t di q i t Q i tα = =∫  is the relative quality of firm i’s 
product. Let (1−s(t)) denote the supply of unskilled workers, and G(α,t) the dis-
tribution of relative quality. Full employment of unskilled workers requires that  
 
1
0
( 1)
1 ( ) ( , )
( )u
s t dG t
w t
θ α αθ
−− = ∫  
           
( 1)
( )uw t
θ
θ
−= , (6) 
which identifies the wage, wu(t)=(θ−1)/(θ(1−s(t))), product demands, 
x(i,t)=α(i,t)(1−s(t)), and profits from manufacturing, π(i,t)= α(i,t)/θ. 
New generations of the product arrive to each firm randomly according to an ex-
ogenous Poisson process with mean intensity µ. Let ( , )i tα  denote the relative 
quality of the current generation of i’s product line. If the firm’s next generation 
arrives at time t , it yields an improvement in relative quality of magnitude λ. In 
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the absence of any other sources of quality change, it is then easy to verify that 
firm i’s relative quality evolves according to the shot noise process 
 ( , ) ( , ) ( ) ( , )d i t i t g t dt dq i tα α= − + , (7) 
where ( ) ( )/ ( )g t Q t Q t=  , and dq(i,t) is a Poisson process with mean intensity µ 
and magnitude λ. However, while manufacturing any generation of product, the 
firm may further enhance its relative quality by employing skilled labor. Let s(i,t) 
denote firm i’s employment of skilled labor. A fraction γ of this skilled labor is 
employed in formal R&D efforts while the remaining 1−γ is employed in man-
agement and related supervisory tasks. Skilled labor in either activity secures in-
creases in relative quality by resolving quality control problems, making minor 
improvements in product design, and so on. We assume that if s(i,t) skilled 
workers are employed for the interval dt, they secure an increase in relative qual-
ity of ( )( , )s i t dtβφ+ . Here, φ measures the ease of learning: a reduction in φ im-
plies a smaller increment to relative quality for any given s, and it raises the 
marginal productivity of skilled labor. The evolution of firm i’s relative quality 
therefore satisfies 
 ( )( , ) ( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( , )d i t i t g t dt s i t dt dq i tβα α φ= − + + +  (8) 
At each point in time, the firm must choose how much skilled labor to employ.  
The marginal value product of s(i,t) is  
 ( ) ( ) ( )11 ( , )
v
t
v t g y dy
t
s i t e dv
ρβθ β φ
∞ − − −−− ∫+∫ . (9) 
The immediate increment to relative quality brought about by an increase in 
s(i,t) is ( ) 1( , )s i t ββ φ −+ ; multiplying this by θ−1 gives the immediate contribution 
to profits. The contribution decays as a result of continued growth elsewhere in 
the economy, and it decays in present value because of discounting. The firm 
chooses s(i,t) at each point in time so that (9) equals the wage, ws(t) of the 
skilled: 
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1
1( ) ( )
( , )
( )
v
t
v t g y dy
t
s
e dv
s i t
w t
βρβ φθ
−∞ − − −∫    = −    
∫
. (10) 
Note that s(i,t) does not depend on α(i,t). Hence s(i,t)=s(t), and (10) also defines 
the aggregate demand for skill. For a given set of parameters, (6) and (10) there-
fore define wages of the skilled and unskilled.  
A. The steady state with a fixed supply of skills 
Assume for the moment that ( )s t s= . In the steady state, the growth rate of the 
economy is fixed. Let this growth rate be g. Then (10) simplifies to 
 
1
1
( ) s
s
g w
ββ φθ ρ
−  = −   +  . (11) 
Measuring wage inequality by the ratio of skilled to unskilled wages, from (6) and 
(11) we have 
 1
(1 )
( 1)( )( )
s
u
w s
w g s β
βω θ ρ φ −
−= = − + + . (12) 
which for given g is decreasing in s  and φ. Using (8), it is easy to show that 
( )( , ) ( ) ( , )dq i t Q t s dt dq i tβφ = + +   . Integrating over i and dividing by Q(t)dt 
yields ( )g s βφ λµ= + + , and hence 
 ( )1
(1 )
( 1) ( )( ) ( )
s
s sβ
βω θ ρ λµ φ φ−
−= − + + + +  (13) 
Comparing across steady states, an increase in complexity (i.e. a reduction in φ) 
is associated with a decline in the growth rate and an increase in wage equality. 
Because the supply of skilled labor is for the moment held fixed, a change in φ 
has no consequence for the intensity of R&D (equal to sγ ).  
For any discussion of the skill premium to be interesting, we require that (13) 
exceed unity at 0s = , which requires that the parameters satisfy the restriction 
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 1( 1) ( ) β
βθ ρ λµ φ φ−− < + + . (14) 
If this inequality is not satisfied, then unskilled labor employed in production is 
always more valuable than skilled labor used in advancing knowledge. In the re-
mainder of the paper, we assume (14) holds. 
Although the model is highly stylized, it generates a well-behaved steady state 
with a stationary cross-sectional distribution for the firm size. Because it is inci-
dental to the main focus of the paper, this distribution is derived in the appen-
dix. 
B. Transition dynamics with a fixed supply of skills 
Although changes in the supply of skills over time are an essential part of our 
story, it is easier and therefore useful to explore first the transitional adjustment 
of wages and economic growth to an increase in complexity when skills are held 
in fixed supply. Imagine at some arbitrary time 0 that a new more complex tech-
nological paradigm emerges. After this time, any new product generations 
adopted by firms embody a technology in which the ease of learning, φ, is re-
duced, say to 'φ . Let ( ; )s t φ  and ( ; ')s t φ  denote the resulting demands for skilled 
labor by firms that have the new and old technologies. At time t, a fraction 
1 te µ−−  of firms are engaged with the new paradigm, while the remainder have 
yet to switch. Thus, aggregate growth is 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( ) 1 ( ; ') ' ( ; )t tg t e s t e s tβ βµ µλµ φ φ λµ φ φ− −= − + + + + + . (15) 
Derivation of the growth rate along the transition path is straightforward. From 
(10), we note that ( ; ') ' ( ; )s t s tφ φ φ φ+ = +  for all t. Full employment of skilled 
labor further requires that ( )( ) ( )1 ( ; ') ' ( ; )t te s t e s t sµ µφ φ φ φ− −− + + + = . Combin-
ing these expressions with (15) yields 
 ( )( )( ) 1 't tg t s e e βµ µλµ φ φ− −= + + + − , (16) 
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which, as is often the case, is a function of an exponentially-weighted average of 
the old and new steady states. The growth rate declines monotonically along the 
transition path, and it is easy to establish that it does so at a declining rate. 
We can also readily obtain an approximation to the transition path of the skill 
premium. Rewrite (11) for firms using technologies with complexity φ, 
 
1
1
( ;
( ( )) ( )s
s t
g t w t
ββφ φ θ ρ
−  ) + =    +  . (17) 
Substituting the relationships between ( ; )s t φ , ( ; ')s t φ , and s , along with (6) and 
(16) yields 
 
( )( )(1 )/
(1 )
( )
( 1) ( ) ( )
s
t
g t g t β β
βω θ ρ λµ −
−= − + − . (18) 
where g(t) is given by (16). As g(t) declines monotonically, it is clear that the 
skill premium rises monotonically to its new steady state. Although g(t) ap-
proaches its new steady state at a declining rate, the time path of w(t) may ei-
ther be strictly concave or S-shaped. 3 
                                         
3 Note that (17) is not exact. The term ( ) 1( )g tρ −+  is the integral of 
( )exp ( ) ( )vt tv t g y dy dvρ
∞ − − −∫ ∫  under the assumption that g is constant, whereas it is 
in fact declining monotonically. Thus, in reality, ω will somewhat exceed the level indi-
cated by (18) along the transition path. With g(t) given by (16), the integral does not 
exist in closed form.  
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C. Endogenous supply of skills 
We now replace the representative agent with a continuum of agents with a con-
stant death rate δ. When an agent dies, she is immediately replaced by a new 
agent. Upon birth, new agents can choose to pay a cost, c, to obtain education. 
Each agent has ability ξ∈[0,1], which is a draw from the uniform distribution. If 
the cost is paid, and the agent chooses to train, she becomes skilled with prob-
ability ξ, and remains unskilled otherwise. Indirect utility is separable in expendi-
ture, so the agent is concerned only to make the education choice that maximizes 
the discounted present value of her lifetime earnings. As an unskilled worker, this 
is ( )
0
( )t ue w t dt
ρ δ∞ − +∫ .  
Restricting attention to the steady state with constant wages, the expected life-
time earnings of an unskilled worker is wu/(ρ+δ). For a worker with ability ξ, ex-
pected earnings are −c+(1− ξ)wu/(ρ+δ)+ ξws/(ρ+δ) if she chooses to train. Given 
these payoffs, workers with ability greater than * ( )/( )s uc w wξ ρ δ= + − , choose 
to pay c, and the corresponding supply of skilled workers is 
( )1 212* 1 ( *)dξ ξ ξ ξ= −∫ . Using (6), (11), and ( )g s βφ λµ= + +  in the expression 
for *ξ , we find that the steady-state supply of skilled labor is the smaller of the 
two solutions to the fixed point expression 
 
( )( )1
2 2
21
(1 *)( )( * ) ( * )
1 ( )
* 1
2
ss s
c
s
β
β θ
θθ ρ λµ φ φ
ρ δ
−
−
−+ + + +
   +  = −   −   
, (19) 
if the smallest solution is positive, and zero otherwise. The solution lies in the 
interval [0,½], and it is easily verified that this is decreasing in φ. Hence, an in-
crease in complexity, as expected, raises the steady-state supply of skilled labor 
(and also R&D effort). As we have seen, g declines in response to an increase in 
complexity when s is fixed. This decline is now at least partially offset by a rise 
in s. To see what the steady-state growth rate is, we can replace s with 
1/( )g βλµ φ− −  in (19), to obtain 
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( )( )1
2 2
21
(1 )( )
1 ( )
1
2
gg g
c
g
β
β θ
θ φθ ρ λµ
ρ δφ
−
−
− ++ +
   +  = + −   −    
 , (20) 
where 1/( )g g βλµ= − . Equation (20) holds whenever an interior solution to (19) 
exists; otherwise, g φ= . In both cases, a reduction in φ unambiguously reduces g  
(and hence g). Hence, the induced increase in s is never sufficient to offset fully 
the direct growth-reducing effect of a decline in φ.    
D. Transition dynamics with an endogenous supply of skills 
When a technological revolution reduces φ, there can be no immediate response 
in skill supply. Existing workers have already chosen their training, and they are 
replaced only gradually, at the rate δdt, by new workers that have yet to choose 
whether to undertake training. Without an increase in skilled wages, there can be 
no increase in supply, so the short-term response to a reduction in φ, must be an 
increase in the skill premium as the new technological paradigm diffuses through 
the economy. The skilled wage increase induces a greater fraction of new workers 
to seek training, and so the supply of skilled workers gradually rises. Our as-
sumption that R&D employment is proportional to s implies that R&D intensity 
also rises. The increased supply of skilled labor will mute the increased wage ine-
quality, and moderate the demand for education. Because a grater fraction of the 
new workers is choosing education, the supply of unskilled workers must decline 
with time. Hence, the wages of unskilled workers rise over time. Thus, the short-
term response to an increase in complexity is to overshoot the long-run equilib-
rium change in wage inequality. The aggregate growth rate also overshoots its 
new long-run equilibrium. A reduction in φ gradually reduces the growth rate as 
more and more firms are affected. Part of this decline is eventually offset by the 
increased skilled labor supply. 
Noting that ( )212( ) 1 ( *) ( )s t s tδ ξ δ= − − , we can derive an approximation for the 
evolution of skilled labor under the assumption that new workers choose their 
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education myopically on the basis of the current skill premium. Letting 
( ) (1 ) 't tt e eµ µφ φ φ− −= + − , we can therefore write 
 
( )( )1
2 2
21
(1 ( ))( )( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( ))
( )( ) 1 ( )
2
s ts t t s t t
cs t s t
β
β θ
θθ ρ λµ φ φ
ρ δδ δ
−
−
−+ + + +
   +  = − −   −    
 . (21) 
The aggregate growth rate satisfies ( )( )( ) ( ) 1 't tg t s t e e βµ µλµ φ φ− −= + + + − , and 
wages satisfy (6) and (10). Column A of Figure 3 provides representative plots 
for parameter values satisfying (14).4 The overshooting of skilled wages and 
growth are clearly evident. For comparison, column B plots the corresponding 
transition dynamics when skilled labor is in fixed supply. 
Conclusions 
In this paper we offer an explanation for the paradox presented by the coexis-
tence of secular increases in R&D expenditure and educational attainment with 
no corresponding increases in per capita income growth. As Jones (2002) pointed 
out, these observations are inconsistent with most endogenous growth models. 
We construct a quality-ladders model in which new product generations arrive 
stochastically at an exogenous rate. Formal R&D and learning by doing influence 
the productivity of the new product. We claim that passive learning became more 
difficult during the latter half of the 20th century, as a result of the increased 
complexity of the technologies that firms have to work with. In this setting, fal-
ling per capita income growth, rising R&D expenditure and rising educational 
attainment are shown to be equilibrium responses to greater complexity.  
                                         
4  The values used in the figure are: φ=.1, φ’=.05, c=3, ρ=.03, δ=.01, β=.8, λ=.05, µ=.1, 
θ=3.  
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Appendix 
The steady-state distribution of firm size. Let α(i,0) denote the initial relative quality of 
firm i. If firm i were never to launch a new product generation, α(i,t) would evolve ac-
cording to the differential equation 
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FIGURE 4. Dynamic responses to a reduction in φ. 
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 ( , ) ( , ) ( )i t i t g s βα α φ= − + + . 
The backward solution is 
 ( )
0
( , ) ( , 0) ( )
t
gt g t si t i e s e dsβα α φ− − −= + +∫  
                 (1 )( )( , 0)
gt
gt e si e
g
βφα
−− − += + , 
where ( )g s βλµ φ= + + . In the steady state, as t → ∞ , this contribution to i’s relative 
quality therefore has mean ( ) /( ( ) )s sβ βφ λµ φ+ + +  and zero variance.  
In addition, however, firm i experiences Poisson jumps of intensity µ and magnitude λ, 
the contribution of each of which decays at the exponential rate g. Let τj(i) denote the 
arrival time of the jth product generation for firm i, and let n(i,t) denote the number of 
new product generations that have been launched by firm i by time t. At time t, the cur-
rent contribution to relative quality of a product generation of vintage t−τ is ( )g te τλ − − . 
Then, including the first and all subsequent product generations yields 
 
( , )
1
(1 )( )( , ) ( , 0) ( , )
n i tgt
gt
j
j
e si t i e x i t
g
βφα α
−
−
=
− += + + ∑ , 
where ( ( ))( , ) jg t ijx i t e
τλ − −= . The τj(i) are i.i.d. random variables, uniformly distributed on 
[0,t]. Using the method of transformations to obtain the pdf of x, we have 
 
1( ) ,
( , ) 0, otherwise
gtgxt e x
f x t
λ λ− − ≤ ≤= 
. 
The characteristic function for x is 
 ˆ 1( , ) ( )
gt
isx
x
e
s t e gxt dx
λ
λ
φ
−
−= ∫  
          1 1ˆcos( )( ) sin( )( )
gt gte e
sx gxt dx i sx gxt dx
λ λ
λ λ− −
− −= +∫ ∫ , 
where ˆ 1i = − . The second inequality comes from Euler’s formula. Let z(i,t) denote the 
contribution of all product generations except the first. As the τj are i.i.d., the character-
istic function for z(i,t) is simply the expectation of the n(i,t)-fold product of φx(s,t), where 
n(i,t) is a Poisson r.v. with mean µt. 
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( , )( , ) ( , )n i tz xs t E s tφ φ =     
          0
( , ) ( )
!
n n t
x
n
s t t e
n
µφ µ −∞
=
= ∑
  
          
[ ]( , ) 1xt s teµ φ −= . 
The last line used the series expansion 0 / !
y n
ne y n
∞
== ∑ . The kth moment is found by 
differentiating φz(s,t) k times with respect to s, multiplying by kˆi− , and evaluating the 
resulting expression at s=0: 
 
[ ] ( )1( ) ( , ) 1 gtm z E z i t eg
λµ= = −
 
 
2 2 2 2 2
2
2 2
( 2 ) ( 2 )
( ) ( , )
2
gt gtg e e g
m z E z i t
g
λ µ µ λ µ λ µ µ− −+ − − − = =  . 
Letting t → ∞ , the steady-state mean and variance of z are lim ( ( , ))t E z i t→∞  
/( ( ) )s βλµ λµ φ= + + and lim var( ( , ))t z i t→∞ = 2 /(2( ( ) ))s βλ µ λµ φ+ + . Finally, adding in 
the current contribution of the first product generation, we have 
 ( )lim ( ( , )) 1
( ) ( )t
sE i t
s s
β
β β
φ λµα λµ φ λµ φ→∞
+= + =
+ + + +
 
and 
 
2
lim var( ( , ))
2( ( ) )t
i t
s β
λ µα λµ φ→∞ = + + . 
As neither moment depends on initial conditions, these expressions are also the 
moments of the steady-state cross-sectional distribution. From the relations between 
α(i,t), profits, and demands given in the main text, we conclude that the limiting distri-
butions of relative quality, profits, and firm size are stationary, with finite variance. Hav-
ing already established that ( )s βλµ φ+ +  is increasing in φ, it is easy to see that the 
variance of firm size increases complexity.  
Sources of data for Figure 1. Expenditure on non federal R&D as a percentage of GDP 
for 1953-2002 is taken from the National Patterns of R&D resources: 2002 provided by 
National Science Foundation, Division of Science Resource Statistics at 
http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/seind04/c4/fig04-05.xls . 
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The number of scientists and engineers engaged in R&D for the period 1950-1980 are 
taken from Jones (2002), and for the rest of the series (1981-1999) an estimate of the 
number of scientists and engineers engaged in R&D is taken from the National Patterns 
of R&D Resources: 2002 provided by the National Science Foundation at 
http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/nsf03313/tables/tab8.xls. Missing data are derived from av-
erages of adjacent years. Labor force data are taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
The number of scientists and engineers engaged in non federal R&D is estimated as in  
Ha and Howitt (2005), being equal to overall scientists and engineers engaged in R&D 
multiplied by non federal R&D/ total R&D expenditure. 
 Average years of educational attainment in the population among persons 25 years 
and older are from Jones for 1950-1980. The remaining years are estimated using Jones’ 
method. The US Census Bureau reports interval data on educational attainment at 
http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/education/tabA-1.xls. In computing the av-
erage we assume that every person in a given interval had schooling equal to the interval 
mean. Persons that have four or more years of college are assumed to have 4 years.    
 GDP per worker in 1996 dollars is from the Penn World Data for the period 1950-
2000 and from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (http://www.bea.gov/bea/newsrel/ 
gdpnewsrelease.htm) for 2001-2003. To estimate Real GDP per hour we take data on 
Real Gross Domestic Product, 2000 Chained Dollars (1950-2003) from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, the National Income and Product Accounts Table 
http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn/nipaweb/SelectTable.asp?Popular=Y. Employment 
data of civilian population of age 16 and older are from Jones for 1950-1979 and from 
Labor Force Statistics (Current Population Survey of the Bureau of Labor Statistics) at 
http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsatabs.htm for the rest of the series. Average weekly hours of 
production are from the Current Population Survey (ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/suppl/ 
empsit.ceseeb2.txt). Assuming an average work load of 50 weeks a year we estimate the 
total number of hours worked in the economy and real GDP per hour. 
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